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This paper investigates racial disparities in household credit constraints using U.K. survey 
data. We find a widening disparity in the proportion of racial minority households reporting 
they face credit constraints compared with non-minority households over the period 2006-
2009. By 2009 three times as many racial minority households faced credit constraints 
compared with White households. The difference in credit constraints across racial minority 
and non-minority households is not explained by a broad set of covariates. While cross-
section variation in reported credit constraints might most likely reflect unobservables, we 
argue this time series variation is very unlikely to arise due to unobservables and is evidence 
of growing perceived disparity in credit access between racial groups over the period.  
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Disclaimer: This paper uses data from a household survey commissioned by the Bank of 
England and undertaken by NMG Consulting. The views expressed in this paper are those of 
the authors, and not necessarily those of the Bank of England or NMG Consulting. The recent recession experienced in the UK and across many OECD nations has been 
characterised as a ‘credit crunch’ in which the supply of credit was heavily curtailed to firms 
and households. Aggregate lending data reveals a sharp fall in lending growth around the 
time of the onset of the recession, consistent with a tightening of household credit constraints. 
Figure 1 illustrates the decline in consumer credit and mortgage lending growth over the 
period from annual growth rates of close to 15% for both series in the early 2000s to 
approximately 0% for the period 2007 onwards. Over the same period the value of housing 
mortgage equity withdrawal – the extraction of housing equity via remortgaging which is not 
re-invested in housing – fell sharply, also illustrated in Figure 1.  
Of course, aggregate lending data reflect changes in both credit demand and supply 
and these data in themselves cannot be interpreted as evidence of tightening credit constraints: 
there might be good reasons to think that household demand for credit changes in periods of 
recession as households adjust to fluctuations in their incomes and expectations about future 
productivity. The identification problem inherent in interpreting aggregate lending data as 
evidence of movements in credit constraints, which cannot be resolved by aggregate data 
alone, is to dissect to what extent the reduction in observed lending to households is 
attributable to lender credit supply versus household credit demand.  
The central goal of this study is to investigate what proportion of households have 
experienced, at least in their perception, binding credit constraints during the recent recession 
and, in particular, whether there is any differential pattern in credit constraints across 
households defined by a range of characteristics, most notably their racial minority status. 
Understanding the evolution of household credit constraints in a recession is crucial for 
household economic activity, most obviously the ability of households to smooth-out their 
consumption through a period of reduced income. Unemployment insurance and other forms 
of income replacement insurance exist in part due to the perceived restriction of credit to 
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 households who face periods of unemployment or reduced income. Furthermore, the key 
argument for the effectiveness of a debt-financed fiscal stimulus policy is the existence of 
household credit constraints.  
To answer this question, the paper uses a newly-available household survey dataset 
which includes questions on credit constraints and household finances. The analysis adopts 
the approach pioneered by Jappelli (1990) and Fissel and Jappelli (1990) in which a 
household survey instrument is used to identify whether households face binding credit 
constraints. The analysis presented is based on successive waves of a household survey which 
included a question on whether respondents were unable to borrow due to the cost of credit or 
difficulty obtaining credit, plus a second question on whether respondents had been 
discouraged from spending due to concerns over future availability of credit.  
The attraction of this approach is that the survey question identifies individuals who 
wanted to borrow but faced a binding borrowing constraint and so identifies a supply-side 
restriction of credit. The second question was designed to capture the negative impact of 
future potentially binding constraints on current consumption as described in Zeldes (1989). 
To the author’s knowledge, this second effect arising due to credit constraints has not 
previously been examined empirically using household survey data. This second question 
focuses on perceived credit constraints and therefore does not necessarily reflect actual credit 
constraints, and also relies on households being willing to report facing such constraints. 
However, for the purposes of understanding individual behaviour, perceived constraints 
might be as important as actual constraints. Responses to both survey questions are then 
examined alongside household characteristics. The most notable pattern found in the data is 
the widening racial disparity in credit constraints over the period considered. 
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 The key element in our identification strategy is to examine the disparity in reported 
credit constraints among racial minority compared with non-minority racial households over 
time. We do not rely solely on a cross-section comparison of reported constraints across 
households: in a cross-section comparison greater reported credit constraints among minority 
households might arise due to unobservables not controlled for in a regression analysis (such 
as historical differences in past credit use or employment history, or willingness to report 
facing a credit constraint). Instead, we exploit the time-variation in reported credit constraints 
which would not be explained by these time-invariant unobservable factors – for example we 
have no reason to believe the onset of the recession impacted racial groups differently in their 
willingness of respondents to self-reported a constraint. To our knowledge, this is the first 
study to present evidence on racial disparities in credit constraints over time and, in particular, 
in a period covering the onset of a severe recession. 
Results show the prevalence credit constraints trebled over the period, from affecting 
9% of households in 2006 to affecting 27% of households by 2010. Results further show that,  
by 2009 racial minority households were two to three times more likely to report facing a 
credit constraint. Econometric analysis suggests this difference across racial groups is not 
explained by demographics, education, income or detailed financial characteristics. That is, 
conditional on a broad set of covariates which to a large extent capture determinants of credit 
supply and demand; racial minority status has become a strong predictor of facing a credit 
constraint. Our results do not provide direct evidence of racial discrimination on the part of 
lenders – for example, we do not have data on how credit application outcomes vary by racial 
background for a given credit score. However, we argue our results show evidence of a 
growing (at least perceived) disparity in access to credit between racial minority and non-
minority households over the period which affected the behaviour of the two groups.  
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 Literature Review 
A key theme in the empirical consumption literature has been the development of 
empirical tests for the existence of liquidity constraints using data at the aggregate, 
international and individual level (Jappelli and Pagano 1989, 1994; Campbell and Mankiw, 
1989, 1991; Attanasio, 1995, 1999).  Within this literature, a subset of studies has focused in 
particular on quantifying the proportion of households facing credit constraints and 
understanding how household behaviour differs among constrained compared with 
unconstrained households. Standard household surveys used by economists contain data on 
the household’s financial position including assets and debts, but it is difficult to infer 
whether the household faces a binding credit constraint from such data alone.  
For example, households may hold low balances on their credit cards because they 
cannot access additional credit, or alternatively they may have substantial additional 
borrowing capacity but hold low balances because they do not wish to borrow at the current 
time. Although balances are typically observed in household data, the borrowing limits which 
apply to the lines of credit on which the balance is held (whether unsecured or secured) 
typically are not. Creditor-provided data can allow the researcher to obtain a measure of the 
credit limit facing a borrower on credit products held with that provider, but not other 
providers. Some studies exploit restrictions in loan-to-value ratios lenders will permit on 
mortgage borrowing to instrument for an unobserved mortgage lending constraint (as in 
Bridges et al. 2009; Hurst and Stafford, 2004), or similarly restrictions on loan-to-value ratios 
for car loans (Attanasio et al, 2008). 
Consequently, economists have attempted to infer the existence of liquidity 
constraints via such as via observed consumption behaviour in response to predictable 
income changes (Parker, 1999; Johnson et al., 2006) or borrowing behaviour in proximity to 
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 credit limits (Gross and Souleles, 2002). Parker (1999) and Johnson et al. (2006) exploit a 
predictable change in household income arising from the timing of tax rebates in the US to 
test for the excess sensitivity of consumption and explores the consumption response of 
households across the income and wealth distributions. Gross and Souleles (2002) obtain 
credit card lender data in which credit limits are observed and exploit a timing convention on 
the timing of credit limit increases to indentify consumer utilisation rates in response to 
exogenous increases in limits. These studies typically find that credit constraints are more 
prevalent among the young and those with lower incomes and low assets. However, 
interpreting these correlations as indicative of a role for credit constraints is potentially 
misleading as low income and low assets may be poor proxies for being credit constrained 
(Crossley and Low, 2011). 
An alternative approach to the problem is to uses survey questions which ask 
households whether they have been refused credit or discouraged from applying for credit on 
the basis of likely rejection. Jappelli (1990) uses survey questions incorporated into the 1983 
Survey of Consumer Finances on whether respondents had recently been applied for credit 
and had their application denied or whether respondents had been discouraged from applying 
for credit on the basis that they would most likely be rejected. The advantage of this approach 
is that a respondent answers on the basis of private information about their credit application 
history across a range of lenders, which is otherwise unobservable in household data. The 
main disadvantage of this approach is that it depends on respondents being willing to report 
their recent credit application history and it is difficult on the basis on respondent answers to 
quantify the magnitude of the constraint facing an individual household. 
One finding from the literature on credit constraints is the pattern in credit constraints 
across households classed by racial type. Existing studies find racial disparities in credit use, 
credit refusals and credit ‘red-lining’. Jappelli (1990) found that individuals from racial 
5 
 minorities were less likely to report being denied credit or discouraged from applying for 
credit. However, subsequent studies have found that individuals from racial minority groups 
are less likely to hold consumer credit, even controlling for a broad range of characteristics 
(Bertraut and Haliassos, 2007) and, furthermore, are more likely to be refused mortgage 
credit conditional on application (Munnell et al, 2006). The identification problem is to 
establish the counterfactual credit supply facing a household with identical characteristics 
other than racial minority status. As this is not possible experimentally, studies rely on 
econometric analysis of household borrowing data and credit application outcomes. 
Bertraut and Haliassos (2006) examine credit card holding and balances using US 
Survey of Consumer Finances data and estimate cross-section models for credit card holding. 
They find that racial minority households are less likely to hold credit cards conditional on 
education, income and financial wealth. They offer a demand-side explanation that racial 
minority households typically exhibit lower income growth and are so less likely to want to 
borrow. However, studies based on credit applications suggest this is not the case. Munnell et 
al (1996) exploited data on proprietary individual mortgage transactions matched with census 
data and credit rating agency data to create a dataset in which a measure of creditworthiness, 
race and demographic characteristics and the outcome of mortgage applications could be 
observed together. The authors found that racial minority status was a statistically significant 
and negative predictor of being granted a mortgage. Similar results on comparable data are 
found by Holloway and Wyley (2001) and Tootell (1996). 
As further evidence of racial differences in credit application acceptance rates, a 
recent study by Cohen-Cole (2011) finds that individuals living in localities with higher 
proportions of racial minority households are less likely to be offered credit compared with 
similar individuals living in non-racial minority dominated areas. This finding is similar to 
that of an earlier study using urban data by Duca and Rosenthal (1993). However, the 
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 findings of Cohen-Cole have been disputed by Brevoort (2011) who shows that Cohen-Cole’s 
result is attributable to errors in data construction and the omission of neighbourhood income 
from estimation. In addition to studies which consider discrimination in mortgage or 
consumer credit lending, other studies also have found evidence of racial disparities in 
insurance premiums (Squires, 1997), lending to businesses (Blanchard et al., 2008; Alesina et 
al., 2008) and car loans (Edelberg, 2007).  
Data and Survey Instrument 
The Dataset 
  The dataset used in this paper is five waves of a cross-sectional household survey 
commissioned by the Bank of England and undertaken by a U.K. market research company, 
NMG, over the period 2006-2010. The ‘Bank of England / NMG Survey’ is an annual survey 
of a representative sample of U.K. households conducted in late September or early October 
each year. Broad results from the survey are documented in an annual feature article in the 
Bank’s Quarterly Bulletin publication.  
The respondent is a self-identified household head who answers on behalf of the 
household / family unit. The dataset includes a broad range of data on household finances 
including household incomes and debts, as well as demographic data, including educational 
background, and labour market status, identified from the respondent. For financial data, the 
respondent is first asked to provide a point estimate for the value. If the respondent answers 
that they do not know the point value, they are then asked to identify the range within which 
the value most likely falls from a menu of banded values. In cases where banded values are 
provided, we take the mid-range of the band as a point value for use in the analysis. 
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 The respondent is also asked to identify himself/herself as either ‘White’ or one of a 
list of ‘non-White’ racial backgrounds (Black-Caribbean, Black-African, Black-Other, Indian, 
Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Chinese, or ‘Other ethnic group’). However, this question on racial 
background was not asked in the 2010 wave of the survey. We do not have any information 
on the racial background of other members of the household unit: so we cannot distinguish 
between couples who are both from a racial minority group and couples where one of the 
couple is from a racial minority group. So we designate ‘racial majority’ as the non-minority 
racial group and ‘racial minority’ as the minority racial group on the basis of respondent 
racial status only. On this basis, 10% of households in the sample have respondents are 
classed in the racial minority group. 
Survey Instrument 
 In addition, in each wave respondents were asked the following two questions: 
1.  Borrowing Constraints Question: ‘Would you like to borrow any more at the moment 
but find it too expensive or difficult to do so?’ (Yes / No) 
2.  Discouraged Spending Question: ‘Have you been put off spending because you are 
concerned that you will not be able to get credit when you need it?’ (Yes / No) 
All respondents were asked both questions. The first question aims to detect 
individuals who desire to borrow at the current time but have either been denied credit or 
discouraged from applying for credit on the grounds of cost. It identifies demand for credit on 
the part of the household by asking ‘Would you like to borrow’ and identifies a binding credit 
constraint through the term ‘find it too expensive or difficult to do so?’ and this separation is 
the main attraction of this question format. The question design contrasts slightly with 
Jappelli (1990), who used responses to a series of questions on whether individuals had been 
refused credit or discouraged from applying for credit which were included in the 1983 
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 Survey of Consumer Finances. The question used here is designed to identify both those who 
have been refused credit and those who have been discouraged from applying for credit. 
The second question aims to detect households who have cut their current 
consumption spending because of concern that credit will not be available in future. Zeldes 
(1989) shows that households who do not currently face a binding borrowing constraint but 
might face a binding constraint in future will cut their current consumption and save in a 
precautionary manner against the possibility of the constraint binding in future, though this 
effect is distinct from the precautionary savings motive for holding wealth. To the author’s 
knowledge this type of question has not been included in any household survey previously, 
despite the theoretical basis for this second-order impact of borrowing constraints on 
household consumption behaviour.  
As discussed earlier, the main attraction of using responses to these subjective survey 
questions to identify credit constrained households is that they reveal otherwise private 
information on the household’s recent credit application experience and adjustment to its 
spending patterns in light of potentially binding credit constraints which is not otherwise 
available to the researcher. The main limitation of the use of responses to these questions is 
that they do not quantify the magnitude of the constraint in terms of the value of additional 
borrowing the household would ideally undertake or, in the case of the second question, the 





 We first present some summary statistics for the sample based on responses to the 
survey instruments and household characteristics. All summary statistics and estimates 
presented are weighted using survey weights. The proportion of households borrowing 
constrained and/or discouraged from spending over the five waves of data is shown in Table 
1.  The proportion of households reporting they were either borrowing constrained or 
discouraged from spending grew from 8.8% in 2006 to 27.1% in 2010. Most of this increase 
is attributable to a larger rise in the proportion of discouraged spenders, which approximately 
quadrupled over the period compared with a doubling of the proportion of borrowing 
constrained households. These data show the proportion of households who perceived they 
were affected by credit constraints by either measure trebled over the period.  
Summary data for the five waves of survey, pooled together, is shown in Table 2. 
‘Age’ is the respondent’s age in years. ‘Male’ is a 1/0 dummy designating a male respondent. 
‘Married’ is a 1/0 dummy designating the respondent is married or in a relationship with a 
live-in partner, and takes a value of 0 otherwise. ‘Children’ is a 1/0 dummy to designate the 
respondent has at least one dependent child. The ‘Employed’, ‘Unemployed’ and ‘Self-
Employed’ 1/0 dummy variables represent three (independent) employment statuses. Two 
further 1/0 dummies designate whether the respondent’s highest educational qualification 
successfully attained was A-Levels (college) or Degree (university) education. The household 
finances variables all refer to the household unit. 
 Pooling the five waves of data, there are 5516 households in the sample. In Table 2 
the sample is split into categories by whether they were borrowing constrained, discouraged 
from spending, both, either or neither. Comparing Columns (d) and (e), those households 
who faced a borrowing constraint or were discouraged from spending are distinct in their 
demographic background by being, on average, younger, less likely to be married, more 
likely to have children and twice as likely to be from a racial minority group. They are also 
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 more likely to be in the labour force, less likely to be homeowners, have on average lower 
incomes, higher values of outstanding unsecured debt plus mortgage debt, and less housing 
equity.   
For some of these characteristics the differences in means between the groups are 
quite large. Households affected by credit constraints are typically nine years younger than 
those unaffected, and 27% more likely to have children. They are more than twice as likely to 
be unemployed and 22% less likely to be homeowners. Affected households have, on average, 
17% lower incomes. It is also notable that households in the affected group are twice as likely 
to report they are from a racial minority background. Column (f) presents p-values from t-
tests for the equivalence of means between Columns (d) and (e) which show there are 
statistically significant differences in the average characteristics of the two groups across a 
broad range of characteristics, including racial minority status. 
A comparison of the number of households in categories (a) to (d) in Table 2 also 
reveals there is not a natural ordering in responses to the two survey questions. Of the 402 
households in the borrowing constrained category (a), only 237 are also in the discouraged 
from spending category (b). One might expect households who are borrowing constrained to 
also be discouraged from spending. However, the survey question on discouraged spending 
asked whether households had been ‘put off spending because you are concerned that you 
will not be able to get credit when you need it’, which refers specifically to a precautionary 
reduction in spending on the basis of potentially future binding borrowing constraints, not a 
reduction in spending due to a current constraint. Households currently facing a binding 
constraint may well not be deterred from spending on the basis of a future potential constraint 
because instead they are prevented from spending by the current constraint.  
 
11 
 Table 3 presents summary statistics by racial minority status. As the racial group 
question was omitted from the 2010 wave of the survey, the data shown in Table 3 is from 
the 2006-2009 waves only, comprised of 4,264 observations. The summary statistics for the 
two groups reveal that racial minority households are typically more likely to include 
children, more likely to have a respondent in employment and the respondent is less likely to 
have a degree. The homeownership rate is lower among racial minority households and 
household income is also typically lower among this group. These differences are all 
statistically significant at the 1% level, as is the average difference in liquidity constraints 
between households in these two groups by both measures of liquidity constraints. 
Tables 4 and 5 break-down the rates of reporting borrowing constraints or 
discouraged spending by respondent characteristics, including racial minority status, over the 
five years of the survey. They show that the prevalence of constraints rose evenly across 
households defined by a broad range of characteristics (excluding race) over the period. 
Turning to households reporting a borrowing constraint in Table 4 first, it is apparent that, 
across all age groups, education groups, income groups, mortgage and unsecured debt groups, 
the rate of borrowing constraints approximately doubled over the period. This indicates a 
broadly even pattern across household characteristics over the wave of the data, showing that 
the increase in credit constraints in the sample as a whole is not explained by a concentration 
of credit constraints in one particular group. 
From Table 5, the prevalence of discouraged spenders across these groups 
approximately trebled with a similarly even pattern across characteristics. There are some 
exceptions: in the case of the 50-64 age range the rate increased eight-fold (though the figure 
for 2006 might be seen as an outlier when compared to subsequent values for this group). 
Similarly, the proportion of those without a degree and below median income increased more 
than for other groups. With these exceptions, in general, the data illustrate a pattern of 
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 tightening credit conditions impacting on all households (as defined across these criteria). 
That is, the pattern of cross-sectional variation in reported rates for both borrowing 
constraints and discouraged spending in 2006 remains through the following five waves of 
data. 
However, for minority racial vs non-minority racial household responses the pattern is 
very different between the two groups. In 2006 the proportion of racial minority households 
reporting borrowing constraints or discouraged spending was very similar to that among non- 
minority racial households. However, between 2006 and 2009 borrowing constraints among 
racial minority groups increased more than four-fold, whereas for non-minority racial groups 
they less than doubled. Similarly, between 2006 and 2009 the rates of reporting discouraged 
spending among racial minority groups increased six-fold whereas among non-minority racial 
groups approximately doubled. 
These differences in average level of credit constraints across the two groups are 
reflected in average levels of debt and debt-to-income ratios for the groups, provided in Table 
6. Average unsecured debt values among racial minority and non-minority households both 
increased over the four years for which the racial group data is available, with no statistically 
significant difference in average levels between them. However, data on average debt-to-
income ratios, which might provide a better indication of a credit constraint by scaling 
unsecured debt by household ability to pay, reveal that this ratio grew faster for racial 
minority households compared with non-minority households, and that by 2009 the 
difference is average ratios between the groups was statistically significant from zero at the 1% 
level. So the increased prevalence of credit constraints among racial minority households is 
reflected in their increased unsecured debt levels relative to income. 
Multivariate Analysis 
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 The pattern in the responses shows that in 2006 there was only a small racial disparity 
in borrowing constraints or discouraged spending across respondents, but by 2009 these rates 
had diverged strongly towards greater prevalence of both responses among racial minority 
households. One possibility is that these differences are explained by associated factors not 
controlled for in the unconditional comparison, such as different income levels or 
characteristics among racial minority compared with non-minority racial group households 
and changes in these over time. Another possibility is that the relationship between racial 
minority status and being credit constrained changed over the period. 
  To examine the first idea, that associated factors explain this difference, two 
multivariate pooled probit models are estimated for each of the credit constrained indicators, 
firstly using a specification which includes income and unsecured debt linearly and secondly 
in a non-linear specification which includes higher-order polynomial terms for both income 
and unsecured debt. As the racial group question was not included in 2010, the analysis is 
limited to the four waves 2006-2009. A range of demographic, socio-economic, housing 
tenure and financial control variables are included in the models. Time dummies and regional 
dummies are also included in the model. Results are shown in Table 7.  
In each of the four models estimated the coefficient on age is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level in each specification. The marginal effect of -0.001 on the age 
variable in each model evaluated against the baseline predicted probabilities implies that a 
household with a household head one decade younger is only 25% more likely to report being 
borrowing constrained in the first model, or 8% more likely to report being discouraged from 
spending in the second model. The coefficient on the unemployment variable is positive in 
each specification and implies a household with an unemployed head is approximately one 
third more likely to report being borrowing constrained or discouraged from spending, 
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 though this coefficient is only statistically significant in the case of the borrowing constrained 
specifications. 
The non-linear specifications in income and unsecured debt show that there are strong 
and statistically significant non-linearities in the relationship between the level of unsecured 
debt held by the household and the likelihood of reporting either outcome, but this is only 
weakly the case for income. These specifications (shown in Columns 2 and 4) demonstrate 
the importance of controlling for non-linearities in the debt-constraint relationship in both 
cases. 
In all four models, racial minority status has a positive and statistically significant (at 
the 1% level) impact on the likelihood of a respondent reporting they are either borrowing 
constrained or a discouraged spender, with little difference in the results from the models in 
which income and unsecured debt enter non-linearly compare with those in which they enter 
linearly. The magnitude of the marginal effect on the racial minority indicator in Columns 1 
and 2 (0.04) evaluated against a baseline predicted probability of 5% suggests that racial 
minority groups are 80% more likely to report being constrained. In the case of Columns 3 
and 4, the marginal effect is 0.07 and the equivalent value for the percentage increase in the 
likelihood of a household from a racial minority group reporting they are discouraged from 
spending is 54%.  
Therefore, the magnitude of the difference in the cross-section pattern in responses to 
these questions by racial minority status in the multivariate model is weaker than in the 
unconditional comparison, but nevertheless racial minority households are nearly twice as 
likely to report being borrowing constrained and half as likely to report being discouraged 
from spending, controlling for a range of demographic, socio-economic and financial 
covariates. To examine whether the relationship between racial minority status and being 
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 credit constrained has changed over time, two further sets of models are estimated in which 
the coefficient on the racial minority status variable is allowed to vary over time. (In the 
pooled probit model the coefficient on the racial minority indicator variable was restricted to 
be the same across waves of the data).  
In Tables 8 and 9 the cross-section probit models estimated on the pooled data in 
Table 7 are re-estimated on each of the four waves of data separately for both dependent 
variables. The specification in which unsecured debt and income enter non-linearly is used 
here. The models include all of the covariates reported in Table 7, including region dummy 
variables. Table 8 presents results for the borrowing constrained dependent variable. The 
pattern in the control variables is very similar to that in Table 7, with the non-linear terms in 
unsecured debt significant in all specifications. The pattern in the racial minority variable is 
notable: the coefficient on the racial minority dummy is not statistically significant in either 
2006 or 2007, but becomes positive, significant and strong in magnitude in the models for the 
2008 and 2009 waves. The baseline average predicted probability for being borrowing 
constrained in 2009 across the whole sample is 5%, so the marginal effect of 0.12 on the 
2009 racial minority variable coefficient implies that racial minority households were nearly 
two and half times more likely to face a borrowing constraint compared with non-minority 
households.  
Table 9 presents results for models with the discouraged spender dummy variable as 
the dependent variable. As with the models shown in Table 8, the pattern in the control 
variables is very similar to that shown before. For this outcome variable, the coefficient on 
the racial minority dummy variable is negative and significant at the 5% level in 2006, 
positive in 2007 and again positive and with stronger statistical significance in 2008 and 2009. 
The marginal effect on the racial minority dummy of 0.14 in 2009 implies a racial minority 
household was nearly twice as likely to report being discouraged from spending. 
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 These results from repeated cross-section probits suggest the relationship between 
racial minority status and reporting a constraint changed over the period. To test this idea 
formally, Table 10 presents results from pooled probit models with year-dummy interaction 
terms of the racial minority variable. This allows a test of the significance of the difference 
between the coefficients on different year interaction terms. However, this approach presents 
the difficulty in correctly interpreting marginal effect terms in non-linear models with 
interaction terms, explained by Ai and Norton (2003). The authors show that standard 
calculations of marginal effects on interaction terms are not applicable to non-linear models, 
and demonstrate how these can be calculated correctly for models with a single interaction 
term, but are undefined for models with multiple interaction terms. 
Consequently, Table 10 presents results from both linear probability models (in which 
3 year-dummy racial minority interaction terms are included to span the four waves of data) 
and probit models in which a single bivariate ‘early period’ (2006 and 2007) / ‘late period’ 
(2008 and 2009) time-dummy interaction term in used. For the probit models the marginal 
effects are then correctly calculated using the Ai and Norton (2003) derivation. Results from 
both models show the same time pattern in the coefficients as in the earlier tables: the racial 
minority dummy is statistically insignificant in the early periods but positive and statistically 
significant from zero at the 1% level in later period. In each case, the coefficients on the later 
year interaction terms are statistically significant from the base term at the 1% level. So these 
results confirm the statistical significance of the difference in the coefficient over time. 
How might we explain this racial disparity in self-reported credit constraints, which is 
robust to a variety of econometric models which account for a range of covariates and time 
effects? As discussed earlier, an increase in the proportion of households reporting they faced 
a borrowing constraint or were discouraged from spending cannot, in itself, be taken as 
indicative of a supply-side contraction in available credit as the increase might be explained 
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 by increased household demand for credit causing more households to hit a binding supply 
constraint imposed by lenders.  
However, it is unlikely that a demand-side explanation would explain the racial 
disparity found in the analysis. That is, for the racial disparity to have arisen due to demand-
side growth in credit demand it must have been the case that, conditional on demographic, 
financial and related variables, racial minority households increased their credit demand by 
more than non-minority racial households over the period considered. Therefore, the only 
plausible interpretation to these results is that racial minority households have found 
themselves more likely to perceive a binding credit constraint since the onset of the recession 
compared with non-minority racial group households. 
Conclusion 
  This study has presented evidence which strongly confirms the idea that the recent 
recession has lead to a large increase in the proportion of UK households facing binding 
credit constraints. It has also shown, for the first time, that a larger fraction of households 
adjust their spending behaviour in a precautionary manner in anticipation of the possible 
future tightening of credit constraints. This study has also shown a disproportionate increase 
in credit constraints reported by racial minority households compared to non-minority racial 
households during recent years.  
This difference in not attributable to differences in age, incomes, employment status, 
demographics or the composition and level of debts across the two types of households and 
so no evident demand-side explanation for the difference is apparent in the data. Whereas the 
previous literature has found that racial minority households are less likely to use or be 
granted credit, we find that for the U.K. no disparity in credit constraints existed in 2006, but 
18 
 a large disparity has emerged since. This racial disparity is much more pronounced during the 
recession period compared to pre-recession. 
  Why do we find this result? It may be the case that the onset of the Great Recession 
caused lenders to alter their attitude towards discriminating between racial minority and non-
minority households. Whereas in a period of credit market growth and general growth in 
household income and ability to repay lenders may have been more willing to pool 
households on the basis of race, tighter market conditions in the recession might have caused 
them to discriminate in this dimension. Alternatively, racial minority households might have 
been affected by the recession differentially compared with non-minority households in some 
dimension not controlled for in the analysis which induced them to perceive a tighter 
constraint (though we control for household income and employment status in flexible 
specifications). We cannot provide a definitive explanation for our result, but document this 
new and sizeable disparity in credit constraints between racial minority and non-minority 
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Figure 1: Annual Growth Rates of Total Secured and Unsecured 
Lending to Individuals (Quarterly Frequency, %) and Quarterly 
Total Sterling Housing Equity Withdrawn by Individuals 
(Seasonally Adjusted, £millions) 1990 Q3 - 2010 Q3











 Table 1: Proportion of Respondents Borrowing Constrained or Discouraged From 

















4.3% 6.9% 6.0% 9.1% 9.1% 
b. Discouraged 
Spenders 
6.6% 11.7% 20.0%  18.9%  24.3% 
Either a. or b. 
 































(a) and (b) 
 
(d) 







(d) and (e) 
N 
 
402 958 237  1123  4393   
Demographics        
Age 39.1  42.5  38.1  42.2  51.2  0.0000 
Male=1 0.51 0.55 0.52 0.54 0.51  0.1019 
Married=1 0.55  0.55  0.50  0.53  0.63 0.0000 




0.21 0.17 0.24 0.17 0.08  0.0000 
Education and 
Employment 
      
Employed=1 0.53  0.54  0.53  0.54  0.49  0.0046 
Unemployed=1 0.09  0.07  0.10  0.07  0.03  0.0000 
Self-
Employed=1 
0.06 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.03  0.3066 
Highest Qual. 
A-Levels=1 




0.26 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.31  0.0002 
Household 
Finances 
      
Homeowner=1  0.43 0.50 0.38 0.50 0.72  0.0000 
Household 
Income (£) 
32,000 33,000 34,000 33,000 36,000 0.0000 
Unsecured 
Debt (£) 








169,000 176,000 135,000 181,000 215,000 0.0001 
 





 Table 3: Summary Statistics by Racial Minority and  


















3840 424   
Demographics      
Age 48.2  49.1  0.2140 
Male=1 0.48  0.53  0.1056 
Married=1 0.61  0.61  0.7510 
Children=1 0.54  0.82  0.0000 
      
Education and Employment      
Employed=1 0.49  0.59  0.0003 
Unemployed=1 0.03  0.05  0.2019 
Self-Employed=1 0.03  0.04  0.5085 
Highest Qual. A-Levels=1  0.21  0.25  0.0628 
Highest Qual. Degree=1 
 
0.35 0.29  0.0084 
Household Finances      
Homeowner=1  0.69 0.48  0.0000 
Household Income (£)  38,000  33,000  0.0003 
Unsecured Debt (£)  2,300  2,300  0.8061 
Mortgage Debt (£,owners only)  82,000  84,000  0.0254 
House Value (£, owners only)  214,000  216,000  0.0487 
      
Liquidity Constraints      
Borrowing Constrained=1  0.06  0.14  0.0000 





 Table 4: Proportion of Respondents Borrowing Constrained by Characteristics,  
2006 – 2010 
 
  2006   2007  2008   2009   2010 
Age         
Age < 35  8.8%  14.4%  12.0%  20.3%  16.7% 
Age 35 - 49  3.5%  6.7%  7.5%  9.6%  10.6% 
Age 50 – 64  2.0%  5.6%  3.2%  4.6%  5.4% 
Age > 65  1.6%  1.4%  0.8%  3.5%  3.1% 
          
Degree Educated         
Has a Degree  3.9%  6.5%  3.5%  7.2%  8.9% 
Doesn’t Have a Degree  4.4%  7.6%  6.8%  9.6%  9.1% 
          
Current Household 
Income 
       
Above Median Income  3.6%  4.9%  4.9%  6.7%  7.6% 
Below Median Income  4.6%  8.1%  7.1%  10.8%  10.6% 
          
Racial Minority Status 
(2006-2009 only) 
       
Racial Minority   3.2%  7.7%  12.8%  23.7%  - 
Non-Racial Minority  4.4%  6.0%  5.3%  7.5%  - 
          
Mortgage Leverage         
LVR ratio >0.6  4.6%  5.4%  10.0%  12.7%  12.6% 
LVR ratio <0.6   4.2%  7.1%  5.5%  8.7%  8.7% 
          
Unsecured Debt         
Debt >£1,000  7.5%  9.8%  8.2%  14.7%  13.4% 
Debt <£1,000  3.0%  5.9%  5.1%  6.6%  7.1% 













 Table 5: Proportion of Respondents Discouraged From Spending by Characteristics, 
2006 – 2010 
 
  2006   2007  2008   2009   2010 
Age         
Age < 35  12.0%  21.5%  23.7%  34.8%  38.0% 
Age 35 - 49  7.0%  14.2%  23.6%  22.1%  30.7% 
Age 50 – 64  2.6%  7.2%  16.5%  12.7%  17.1% 
Age > 65  2.3%  4.3%  7.2%  8.1%  9.2% 
          
Degree Educated         
Has a Degree  3.9%  11.4%  14.6%  15.1%  23.9% 
Doesn’t Have a Degree  7.4%  12.1%  21.6%  20.2%  24.6% 
          
Current Household 
Income 
       
Above Median Income  6.5%  9.6%  15.6%  14.6%  20.7% 
Below Median Income  6.7%  12.1%  23.9%  23.0%  28.5% 
          
Racial Minority Status 
(2006-2009 only) 
       
Racial Minority   6.2%  15.0%  30.8%  38.1%  - 
Non-Racial Minority  7.2%  10.5%  18.8%  16.9%  - 
          
Mortgage Leverage         
LVR ratio >0.6  12.3%  17.6%  21.3%  28.2%  37.9% 
LV ratio <0.6   6.1%  11.3%  29.8%  18.0%  23.1% 
          
Unsecured Debt         
Debt >£1,000  12.8%  21.9%  28.2%  28.9%  41.3% 
Debt <£1,000  4.2%  7.9%  16.7%  14.7%  17.9% 













 Table 6: Summary Statistics for Unsecured Debt and Debt-to-Income Ratio, 














of means (a) 
and (b) 
Average Unsecured Debt (£)      
2006 2040  1790  0.6636 
2007  2060 2060 0.9892 
2008  2400 1950 0.4865 
2009  2700 3150 0.4865 
      
Debt-to-Income Ratio      
2006 0.11  0.08  0.4388 
2007  0.10 0.09  0.7527 
2008  0.12 0.19  0.2125 




















 Table 7: Pooled Probit Estimates for Borrowing Constrained / Discouraged Spending 
 
  Borrowing Constrained  Discouraged from Spending 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
        









































































































N 4264  4264  4264  4264 
Pseudo-R
2 0.12  0.12  0.11  0.11 
Baseline Predicted Probability  0.05  0.05  0.12  0.12 
 
Notes: standard error show in parenthesis, marginal effect shown in square brackets. * denotes 
statistical significance at the 5% level, ** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. Model 
includes dummies for educational qualifications (gcse, a-levels, degree), dummies for marital 
status, employment status, age squared, homeownership status (outright owner, mortgaged 
owner, private renter) plus house value, mortgage value, monthly mortgage payment, monthly 
payment on unsecured debt plus time dummies and regional dummies. Values for household 




 Table 8: Repeated Cross Section Probit Estimates for Borrowing Constrained –  










        
































































































































N 1018  1145  1093  1008 
Pseudo-R
2 0.22  0.21  0.14  0.19 
Baseline Predicted Probability  0.01  0.03  0.04  0.05 
 
Notes: standard error show in parenthesis, marginal effect shown in square brackets. * denotes 
statistical significance at the 5% level, ** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. Model 
includes dummies for educational qualifications (gcse, a-levels, degree), dummies for marital 
status, employment status, age squared, homeownership status (outright owner, mortgaged 
owner, private renter) plus house value, mortgage value, monthly mortgage payment, monthly 
payment on unsecured debt plus time dummies and regional dummies. Values for household 




 Table 9: Repeated Cross Section Estimates for Discouraged Spender –  










        
































































































































N 1018  1145  1093  1008 
Pseudo-R
2 0.20  0.21  0.18  0.19 
Baseline Predicted Probability  0.04  0.07  0.14  0.17 
 
Notes: standard error show in parenthesis, marginal effect shown in square brackets. * denotes 
statistical significance at the 5% level, ** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. Model 
includes dummies for educational qualifications (gcse, a-levels, degree), dummies for marital 
status, employment status, age squared, homeownership status (outright owner, mortgaged 
owner, private renter) plus house value, mortgage value, monthly mortgage payment, monthly 
payment on unsecured debt plus time dummies and regional dummies. Values for household 






Table 10: Estimates for Borrowing Constrained / Discouraged Spending,  
Time Effect Interaction Terms  
 
  Borrowing Constrained  Discouraged from Spending 
  (1) LPM  (2) Probit  (3) LPM  (4) Probit 
        































N 4264  4264  4264  4264 
Pseudo R
2  0.08 0.11  0.12  0.13 
Baseline Predicted Probability  -  0.05  -  0.12 
        
Notes: standard error show in parenthesis, for probit estimates marginal effect shown in square 
brackets. * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, ** denotes statistical significance at 
the 1% level. Model includes dummies for educational qualifications (gcse, a-levels, degree), 
dummies for marital status, employment status, age squared, homeownership status (outright 
owner, mortgaged owner, private renter) plus house value, mortgage value, monthly mortgage 
payment, monthly payment on unsecured debt plus time dummies and regional dummies. Values 
for household income, unsecured debt, house value and mortgage value are each divided by 
10,000. 
 
 